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1 Introduction 
Despite experiencing stable and sustained growth over almost two decades, several Sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries have not experienced a commensurate reduction in poverty. 
The present paper identifies and interprets the distributional changes that occurred in most of 
these countries, which have offset the positive impact of growth in reducing poverty. 
Recent estimates, based on an international poverty line of US$1.90 (in 2011 PPP U.S. 
dollars), suggest that poverty declined only by 23 percent between 1990 and 2012 (from 56 
percent in to 43 percent) (Beegle et al., 2016). This rate is much lower than those experienced 
by countries with similar growth rates and similar poverty rates in other regions. World Bank 
(2018) calculates that in a typical non-African developing country where 50 percent of the 
population is living below the poverty line, a 1 percent yearly growth in GDP led to a reduction 
of 0.53 percentage points a year in the incidence of poverty. In contrast, the same 1 percent per 
capita GDP growth in a typical African country with the same poverty incidence reduced 
poverty by only 0.16 percentage point. 
The explanations for this lower growth poverty-elasticity in Africa are generally two: one 
questioning the veracity of the recent African economic boom (the so-called African miracle) 
and another looking at the role of inequality. Jerven (2013, 2015) has provided evidence on the 
problems afflicting GDP calculations in Africa and argued that for many SSA countries the 
recent high growth is merely statistical or, in other words, a feature of adding the informal sector 
that previously was not counted (Jerven, 2015). Since growth is overstated, it is thus not 
surprising that poverty did not fall so rapidly. 
Although this argument has some validity, it does not completely solve the low elasticity 
puzzle. Figure 1 compares the average annual GDP per capita growth and average consumption2 
growth from available household surveys; consumption is the welfare measure typically used 
to calculate poverty rates and growth is the factor that really matters in poverty reduction 
(Adams, 2004; McKay, 2013). Indeed, the discrepancy between GDP per capita growth and 
household consumption growth is higher in SSA than in the rest of the developing world, yet 
SSA registers an average annual growth of household consumption of about 1.02 percent per 
year, not much lower than the South Asia Region (SAR) and slightly higher than Latin America. 
Therefore, household consumption increased in SSA not differently from other developing 
regions but still poverty declined slower. 
                                                 
2 For Latin America we computed average income growth for the household surveys. 
3 
 
 
Figure 1: GDP per capita and household consumption average growth rates: 1999-2014. 
 
 
Regarding inequality, literature has debated its relation with growth and poverty. Dollar 
and Kray (2002) show that all income groups tend to benefit proportionally from increases in 
economic growth and that income distribution does not really matter for poverty reduction. 
Bourgignon (2003) and Ravallion (2007) find that inequality reduces the poverty-reducing 
effects of economic growth. Thorbecke (2013) argues that the combination of high endemic 
poverty and inequality is in general responsible for low growth elasticity of poverty. High initial 
poverty and inequality reduces directly the growth rate but also indirectly the poverty-reducing 
effect of this growth. Looking at SSA, Fosu (2009, 2015) finds that economic growth reduces 
poverty while growth elasticity is a decreasing function of initial inequality. Therefore, the low 
elasticity registered in SSA in the last two decades could potentially be attributed to an increase 
in inequality that limited the pro-poor content of growth. 
Unfortunately, when measured with standard indicators like Gini, there is no clear 
evidence of an increase in inequality in the last two decades. Pinhovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 
(2014) show that the recent SSA growth spurt was, in fact, accompanied by a generalized 
decrease of inequality. Beegle et al. (2016), analyzing the SSA countries for which there are 
two comparable surveys, conclude that about half of them experienced a decline in inequality 
while the other half saw an increase. Cornia et al. (2017) find a bifurcation in inequality trends 
4 
 
in SSA:  17 countries experienced declining inequality, whereas 12 countries, predominantly in 
Southern and Central Africa, recorded an inequality rise. 
At first glance therefore, there is no clear pattern in SSA that can explain through 
increasing inequalities the low elasticity of poverty. From a distributional point of view, thus, 
it is still unclear why growth did not translate into greater household consumption at the bottom 
of the income distribution at rates comparable with those experienced in other regions of the 
world (Christaensen et al., 2014; Thorbecke, 2013). 
The central argument of this paper is that significant distributional changes against 
poverty reduction have, in fact, taken place in most of the SSA countries we analyze. These 
changes affected predominantly the lower part of the welfare distribution and went undetected 
by standard inequality measures. The reason is simple. Summary measures like the Gini do not 
assign a weight to the different percentiles; if a pro-inequality change in one part of the 
distribution is more than compensated by a pro-equality change in the rest of the distribution, 
the Gini will decline. The distributional changes that matter most for poverty reduction, 
however, are those localized in the lower part of the distribution but can be detected only if we 
are able to focus on this part only.  
To analyze these changes, this paper develops a novel yet simple decomposition based on 
the “relative distribution” method (Handcock and Morris, 1998, 1999). The strength of this 
decomposition consists of providing a non-parametric framework for taking into account all the 
distributional differences that could have affected the variation in the poverty rate and countered 
the pro poor effect of growth.  In this way, it enables to summarize multiple features of the 
welfare distribution that a standard decomposition based on summary inequality measures 
would not have detected (Datt and Ravallion, 1992; Kolenikov and Shorrocks, 2005). 
The paper is organized as follows Section 2 outlines the distinctive features of the relative 
distribution approach and presents the proposed decomposition. Section 3 discusses the data 
and provides summary statistics. Section 4 details the main findings of the study. Section 5 
provides summary conclusions. 
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2 Methodology  
2.1 Polarization and relative distribution  
Over the last two decades, the issue of polarization has gained increasing importance in the 
analysis of income distribution (Foster and Wolfson, 1992; Levy and Murnane, 1992; Esteban 
and Ray, 1994; Wolfson; 1994, 1997) and now it seems to be widely accepted that polarization 
is a distinct concept from inequality. 
A general notion of income polarization (Esteban and Ray, 1994) regards it as 
“clustering” of a population around two or more poles of the distribution, irrespective of where 
they are located along the income scale. The notion of income polarization in a multi-group 
context is an attempt at capturing the degree of potential conflict inherent in a given distribution 
(see Esteban and Ray, 1999, 2008, 2011). The idea is to consider society as an amalgamation 
of groups, where the individuals in a group share similar attributes with its members (i.e. have 
a mutual sense of “identification”) but they are different from the members of the other groups 
(i.e. have a feeling of “alienation”). 
Political or social conflict is therefore more likely the more homogeneous and separate 
the groups are, that is when the within-group income distribution is more clustered around its 
local mean and the between-group income distance is longer (see, inter alia, Gradín, 2000, 
Milanovic, 2000, D’Ambrosio, 2001, Zhang and Kanbur, 2001, Reynal-Querol, 2002, Duclos 
et al., 2004, Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia, 2006, Esteban et al., 2007, Gigliarano and Mosler, 
2009, and Poggi and Silber, 2010). 
The use of summary measures of income polarization is common in literature. The 
approach used in this paper, the so-called “relative distribution”, combines the strengths of 
summary polarization indices with details of distributional change that the kernel density 
estimate yields. The relative distribution method has been employed by Alderson et al. (2005), 
Massari (2009), Massari et al. (2009a,b), Alderson and Doran (2011, 2013), Borraz et al. (2013), 
Clementi and Schettino (2013, 2015), Clementi et al. (2017, 2018), Molini and Paci (2015), 
Petrarca and Ricciuti (2016), Nissanov and Pittau (2016), and Nissanov (2017). 
More formally,3 let Y0 be the income variable for the reference population and Y the 
income variable for the comparison population. The relative distribution is defined as the ratio 
                                                 
3 Here we limit ourselves to illustrating the basic concepts behind the use of the relative distribution method. 
Interested readers are referred to Handcock and Morris (1998, 1999) for a more detailed explication. 
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of the density of the comparison population to the density of the reference population evaluated 
at the relative data r: 
 ݃ሺݎሻ ൌ 	 ௙൫ிబషభሺ௥ሻ൯௙బቀிబషభሺ௥ሻቁ ൌ 	
௙ሺ௬ೝሻ
௙బሺ௬ೝሻ ,									0 ൑ ݎ ൑ 1,							ݕ௥ ൒ 0, (1) 
where f (∙) and f0 (∙) denote the density functions of Y and Y0, respectively, and yr = ܨ଴ି ଵሺݎሻ is 
the quantile function of Y0. When no changes occur between the two distributions, g(r) has a 
uniform distribution; a value of g(r) higher (lower) than 1 means that the share of households 
in the comparison population is higher (lower) than the corresponding share in the reference 
population at the rth quantile of the latter. 
One of the major advantages of this method is the possibility to decompose the relative 
distribution into changes in location and changes in shape. The decomposition can be written 
as: 
 ௙ሺ௬ೝሻ௙బሺ௬ೝሻถ
ை௩௘௥௔௟௟
ൌ 	 ௙೚ಽሺ௬ೝሻ௙బሺ௬ೝሻᇣᇤᇥ
௅௢௖௔௧௜௢௡
	ൈ	 ௙ሺ௬ೝሻ௙బಽሺ௬ೝሻᇣᇤᇥ
ௌ௛௔௣௘
. (2) 
F0L (yr) is the median-adjusted density function: 
 ଴݂௅ሺݕ௥ሻ ൌ 	 ଴݂ሺݕ௥ ൅ ߩሻ, (3) 
where the value ߩ is the difference between the medians of the comparison and reference 
distributions—alternative indices like the mean and/or multiplicative location shift can also be 
considered. 
The relative distribution approach also includes a median relative polarization index, 
which is a measurement of the degree to which the comparison distribution is more polarized 
than the reference one: 
 ܯܴܲ ൌ 	 ସ௡	ቀ∑ ቚݎ௜ െ
ଵ
ଶቚ௡௜ୀଵ ቁ െ 1. (4) 
The values of the MRP index range between -1 and 1: positive values represent more income 
polarization and negative values represent less polarization; a value of 0 indicates no difference 
in distributional shape. The MRP index can be additively decomposed into the lower relative 
polarization index and the upper relative polarization index, which behave similarly as the 
MRP. 
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2.2 Decomposition   
 The relative distribution is a well-established approach to distributional analysis, whereas novel 
is the polarization-poverty and growth decomposition we develop for showing how the 
distributional changes we observed in many SSA countries have effectively limited the impact 
of growth on poverty reduction. 
In general terms, poverty ܲሺݖ, ߤ, ܮሻ is expressed in terms of poverty line, ݖ, mean income 
level, ߤ, and the Lorenz curve, ܮ, representing the structure of relative income inequalities. 
Assuming the poverty line is fixed at a given level, poverty is given by ܲ ሺߤ, ܮሻ. The total change 
in poverty, ∆ܲ, is then decomposed into two components. The first component is the growth 
component due to changes in the mean income while holding the Lorenz curve constant at some 
reference level, and the second is a redistribution component due to changes in the Lorenz curve 
while keeping the mean income constant at some reference level. 
Following Heshmati (2007), one can compute growth and inequality decompositions in 
various ways. Kakwani and Subbarao (1990) introduced the following decomposition: 
 ∆ܲ ൌ ܲሺߤଵ, ܮଵሻ െ ܲሺߤ଴, ܮ଴ሻ ൌ ሾܲሺߤଵ, ܮ଴ሻ െ ܲሺߤ଴, ܮ଴ሻሿᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ீ
൅ ሾܲሺߤଵ, ܮଵሻ െ ܲሺߤଵ, ܮ଴ሻሿᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ
, (5) 
where ߤ and ܮ are mean income and the Lorenz curve characterizing the distribution of income. 
The subscripts 0 and 1 denote the two (consecutive or non-consecutive) initial and final periods 
of observation, and ܩ and ܴ are contributions from the growth and redistribution components. 
Jain and Tendulkar (1990) suggested an alternative formulation: 
 ∆ܲ ൌ ܲሺߤଵ, ܮଵሻ െ ܲሺߤ଴, ܮ଴ሻ ൌ ሾܲሺߤଵ, ܮଵሻ െ ܲሺߤ଴, ܮଵሻሿᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ீ
൅ ሾܲሺߤ଴, ܮଵሻ െ ܲሺߤ଴, ܮ଴ሻሿᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ
, (6) 
which differs from the previous decomposition by the reference point (base year versus final 
year) that is initially chosen for computation of growth and redistribution components. 
Kakwani (2000) suggested a simple averaging of both the growth and inequality 
components from Equations (5) and (6), which is: 
																																					∆ܲ ൌ 12 ሼሾܲሺߤଵ, ܮ଴ሻ െ ܲሺߤ଴, ܮ଴ሻሿ ൅ ሾܲሺߤଵ, ܮଵሻ െ ܲሺߤ଴, ܮଵሻሿሽᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ீ
 
൅ଵଶ ሼሾܲሺߤଵ, ܮଵሻ െ ܲሺߤଵ, ܮ଴ሻሿ ൅ ሾܲሺߤ଴, ܮଵሻ െ ܲሺߤ଴, ܮ଴ሻሿሽᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ
.  (7) 
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Datt and Ravallion (1992) found the above decompositions of poverty changes as being 
time path dependent, arising through and dependent on the choice of reference levels. To make 
the changes path independent they proposed adding an extra residual ܧ as follows: 
 ∆ܲ ൌ ܲሺߤଵ, ܮଵሻ െ ܲሺߤ଴, ܮ଴ሻ ൌ ሾܲሺߤଵ, ܮ଴ሻ െ ܲሺߤ଴, ܮ଴ሻሿᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ீ
൅ ሾܲሺߤଵ, ܮଵሻ െ ܲሺߤଵ, ܮ଴ሻሿᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ
൅ ܧ. (8) 
The residual in (8) can be interpreted as the difference between the growth (redistribution) 
components evaluated at the terminal and initial Lorenz curves (mean incomes), respectively. 
The above decompositions compute the growth and redistribution effects of poverty 
change through an analysis of mean incomes and relative inequalities. However, results would 
be different if the analysis is carried out through median incomes and absolute income gaps—
as it is in the spirit of the relative distribution approach.4 In such an eventuality, the poverty 
change between two periods, ݐଵ and ݐଶ, into growth and redistribution components is 
decomposed as follows:5 
 ܪܥܴ௧మ െ ܪܥܴ௧భᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
Variation
ൌ ൫ܪܥܴ௧భ௅ െ ܪܥܴ௧భ൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ீభ
൅ ൫ܪܥܴ௧మ െ ܪܥܴ௧భ௅ ൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோభ
, (9) 
when ݐଵ is the period of reference, and: 
 ܪܥܴ௧మ െ ܪܥܴ௧భᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
Variation
ൌ ൫ܪܥܴ௧మ െ ܪܥܴ௧మ௅ ൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ீమ
൅ ൫ܪܥܴ௧మ௅ െ ܪܥܴ௧భ൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோమ
, (10) 
when ݐଶ is the period of reference. In the above: 
 ܪܥܴ௧భ ൌ
∑ ଵቀ௬೔೟భழ௭ቁ೔ಿసభ
ே : poverty headcount ratio of the first period.6 
 ܪܥܴ௧మ ൌ
∑ ଵቀ௬೔೟మழ௭ቁ೔ಿసభ
ே : poverty headcount ratio of the second period. 
 Variation ൌ ܪܥܴ௧మ െ ܪܥܴ௧భ: difference in poverty headcount ratio between ݐଶ and ݐଵ. 
 ܩଵ ൌ ܪܥܴ௧భ௅ െ ܪܥܴ௧భ: growth component when ݐଵ is the period of reference; ܪܥܴ௧భ௅  is 
the poverty headcount ratio of the first period when all incomes ݕ௜௧భ of the first period 
                                                 
4 On the importance of paying more heed to absolute difference as well, rather than to relative difference only, 
see e.g. Atkinson and Brandolini (2010) and references therein. 
5 Here, we assume that the headcount ratio is the poverty measure’s precise functional form. In Section 5, we shall 
apply the decompositions to another common poverty measure, the poverty gap index, given by the aggregate 
income short-fall of the poor as a proportion of the poverty line and normalized by population size, i.e. ܲܩ ൌ
ଵ
ே∑ ቀ
௭ି௬೔
௭ ቁ
௤
௜ୀଵ , where ݍ is the number of poor people in the population. 
6 The “1” indicator at the numerator is a function assuming value 1 if the ݅th individual has income ݕ below the 
poverty line ݖ, and assuming value 0 otherwise. Note that ܰ  is the size of total population, and not the total number 
of poor individuals. 
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are additively shifted by ߩଵ ൌ ݉௧మ െ ݉௧భ, where ݉௧భ and ݉௧మ are the medians of the 
two distributions. 
 ܴଵ ൌ ܪܥܴ௧మ െ ܪܥܴ௧భ௅ : redistribution component when ݐଵ is the period of reference. 
 ܩଶ ൌ ܪܥܴ௧మ െ ܪܥܴ௧మ௅ : growth component when ݐଶ is the period of reference; ܪܥܴ௧మ௅  is 
the poverty headcount ratio of the second period when all incomes ݕ௜௧మ of the second 
period are additively shifted by ߩଶ ൌ ݉௧భ െ ݉௧మ, where ݉௧భ and ݉௧మ are the medians of 
the two distributions. 
 ܴଶ ൌ ܪܥܴ௧మ௅ െ ܪܥܴ௧భ: redistribution component when ݐଶ is the period of reference. 
Taking the average of (9) and (10) yields the following decomposition of the variation in 
the poverty headcount between the two periods ݐଵ and ݐଶ: 
 ܪܥܴ௧మ െ ܪܥܴ௧భᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
Variation
ൌ ଵଶ ሺܩଵ ൅ ܩଶሻᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
ீ
൅ ଵଶ ሺܴଵ ൅ ܴଶሻᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
ோ
, (11) 
which is the one we shall use in the subsequent empirical analysis. 
3 Data and summary statistics 
The data used in the paper are obtained from national household surveys from as many countries 
as possible through PovcalNet.7 PovcalNet is the global database of national household surveys 
compiled by the research department of the World Bank, and it is the source of the World 
Bank’s global poverty estimates. 
In our analysis, we use 48 comparable household surveys for 24 Sub-Saharan African 
countries, the same Beegle et al. used (2016).8 For each country, we consider two survey years 
distant enough in time to allow for meaningful comparisons of consumption distributions. This 
distance varies between 5 and 14 years, because the household surveys are not released every 
year in every country but take place in different periods for each country. Overall, the period 
observed covers two decades, since the late 1990s to the early years of this decade. 
                                                 
7 GLOBAL TSD/GPWG ([year of access (2017. As of [date of access (12/10/2017)] via Datalibweb Stata Package. 
8 Namely, the countries analyzed are: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia. 
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We use (per capita) household expenditure as the main welfare indicator throughout the 
analysis.9,10 In that, we depart from the literature using income as a measure of well-being. In 
economies where agriculture is an important and established sector, consumption has indeed 
proven preferable to income because the latter is more volatile and more highly affected by the 
harvest seasons, so that relying on income as an indicator of welfare might under- or over-
estimate living standards significantly (see, for instance, Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). On the 
theoretical ground, as consumption gives utility to individuals, the analysis of its distribution 
should be the most natural approach to study well-being. Income matters insofar as it gives 
access to consumption, which is the ultimate source of individual welfare. Consumption is a 
better measure of long-term welfare also because households can borrow, draw down on 
savings, or receive public and private transfers to smooth short-run fluctuations. 
As the data show, for many of the countries studied average household consumption 
increased over time, following the significant economic growth Sub-Saharan Africa 
experienced over the last decades (e.g. Beegle et al., 2016). We can see this trend in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Household consumption mean growth rates for each country. 
 
 
                                                 
9 To enhance comparability among the very different surveys, all consumption values are expressed in 2011 
international dollars (PPP). 
10 For Ghana, we use the national poverty line in local currency. For Nigeria, we estimate the consumption 
distribution for 2003/04 using a “survey-to-survey” imputation method. For more details, see Clementi et al. 
(2015). 
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Standard measures of inequality seem not to capture this widening gap between rich and 
poor. As shown in Figure 3, both the Gini and Theil indices declined for most of the analyzed 
countries, even though they start from a very high level. 
 
Figure 3: Gini index and Theil index variations for each country. 
 
 
As for polarization, calculation of the Foster-Wolfson (FW) and Duclos-Esteban-Ray 
(DER) indices produced evidence that is mixed and thus hard to interpret.11 
4  Empirical results 
In this section, we first provide an overview of the results of the standard relative distribution 
decomposition into growth effect and shape effect showing that in most analyzed countries, the 
consumption distribution polarized, in particular, in the lower tail of the distribution; in other 
words, these countries faced a significant process of lower polarization. In the second part, by 
decomposing the poverty variation into growth and shape effects, we show how this lower 
polarization offset the potential gains stemming from growth in consumption.  
 
                                                 
11 The inequality indices (Gini and Theil) and the polarization indices (Foster-Wolfson and Duclos-Esteban-Ray) 
have been estimated using the Distributive Analysis Stata Package, which is freely available at 
http://dasp.ucn.ulaval.ca/. 
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4.1 Changes in Sub-Saharan Africa’s consumption distributions 
Figure 4 presents the overall distribution and the decomposition into location and shape for three 
countries, one for each macro-region: Ghana for West Africa, Ethiopia for East Africa and 
South Africa for the Southern cone.12 The left panel for each country depicts the overall relative 
distribution, showing the fraction of households in the comparison year’s distribution that fall 
into each decile of the reference year’s distribution. The location effect, i.e. the effect only due 
to the median shift, is shown in the middle panels of Figure 4. Finally, the right panels of Figure 
4 display the shape effect, which represents the relative distribution net of the median influence. 
 
Figure 4: Relative distribution plots. 
 
(a) Relative density      (b) Location effect             (c) Shape effect 
 
Ghana 
         
 
 
Ethiopia 
       
 
 
South Africa 
                                                 
12 The analysis has been performed using the R package reldist (Handcock, 2016). The results for the remaining 
34 countries are available upon request. 
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 Looking at the shape effect graphs, we observe a clear concentration in the lowest decile. 
Values above 1 indicate that, in relative terms, there are more households in that decile of the 
distribution at the end of the period than there were at the beginning, vice versa less than 1 
means there are less, and equal to 1 means that things have not changed: 10 percent of 
households were in that decile at the beginning and 10 percent remained there. Therefore, 
relative to the initial period, households in the lowest percentiles of each country increased by 
14 percentage points (+1.4 over 1) in Ethiopia, 20 (+2 over 1) in Ghana and 15 in South Africa 
(+1.5 over 1). In the three countries, this concentration in the lower tails (downgrading) is 
paralleled by a similar but smaller concentration in the upper tails (upgrading). Overall, the two 
effects produce a U-shaped relative density; households are concentrated in the tails of the 
distribution while the middle of the distribution hollows out. 
For the sake of space, we analyze the performance of the remaining countries using the 
relative polarization indexes; these keep track of changes in the shape of the distribution and 
measure their direction and magnitude. Figure 5 plots the median, lower and upper polarization 
indexes for each country on a map. The null hypothesis of no change with respect to the 
reference distribution is tested for each index and in 21 of the 24 countries, the variation in the 
indexes is significant.13 
The type of distributional change observed for Ghana, Ethiopia and South Africa is 
closely replicated by 16 other countries; all of them experience a significant increase in 
polarization that is predominantly driven by a downgrading of the consumption distribution, the 
only notable exception being Nigeria where upgrading and downgrading are almost equivalent 
(see Clementi et al., 2017). Interestingly, the polarization phenomenon appears widespread in 
the region, while only in Madagascar and Zambia it decreased significantly. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Results are available upon request. 
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Figure 5: Relative polarization indices. 
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 Another common feature of the group of polarizing countries is that the Gini index either 
increased little or, as mentioned before, decreased. It is interesting to note that in the same 
period, economies more advanced than the SSA African ones, but equally reliant on 
commodities such as the Russian Federation and Brazil, experienced similar distributional 
changes. Nissanov and Pittau (2015) find that during the commodity boom of the 2000s, 
household net income restarted to grow after a long decline, Gini decreased while polarization 
increased, driven mainly by a downgrading in the income distribution. Likewise, Clementi and 
Schettino (2015) find that the decline in Gini experienced in Brazil between 2000-12 is 
accompanied by a hollowing out of the middle of the distribution and accentuated concentration 
of households in the lower tail. 
4.2 Decomposition results  
Once ascertained that there was a significant pro-polarization distributional change in the clear 
majority of SSA countries analyzed, we now proceed by linking this change to poverty 
reduction or lack thereof. 
Figure 6 displays the results of the poverty “growth and polarization” decomposition (11) 
that explicitly links the downgrading of the distribution to the reduced impact of growth on 
poverty. Results are self-explanatory: in 13 of the 19 countries where the lower polarization 
took place, it offset the poverty reduction benefits that could have arisen from growth. The 
magnitude differs from a minimum registered by Senegal to a maximum registered by South 
Africa; on average, this effect contributed to a 5-6 percentage points lessening in poverty 
reduction.   
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Figure 6: Variation in the poverty headcount ratio and decomposition into growth and 
redistribution components (our method). 
  
 
 The question then arises as to why standard measures/decompositions did not capture 
this effect. Figures 7(a) and 7(b) compare our approach and the growth and distributive effects 
of a widely-used decomposition, that of Datt and Ravallion (1992). As it appears, the negative 
distributive effect (against poverty reduction) of this latter is always minimal or in many cases 
the distributional change is pro-poor. Our point is that the distributional change SSA countries 
went through could only be detected by the method we propose, and not by decompositions 
based on standard summary tools to measure distributional changes.  
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Figure 7.a: Comparison of growth component between our methods and the Datt and 
Ravaillon’s one. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.b: Comparison of redistribution component between our method and the Datt and 
Ravaillon’s one. 
  
 The reason is simple. Summary measure like Gini analyze the dispersion around the 
mean of the distribution and this, as shown in Figure 7, either did not change or sometimes 
improved in Africa. Also, most importantly, summary measures do not assign a weight to the 
different percentiles; therefore, if a pro-inequality change in one part of the distribution is more 
than compensated by a pro-equality change in the rest of the distribution, these measures will 
decline. Yet, the distributional changes that matter most for poverty reduction are those 
localized in the lower part of the distribution but can be detected only if one can look at changes 
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at a very granular level.  The type of decomposition we propose can shed light on this, whereas 
standard decompositions based on summary measures like Gini likely cannot. 
The results of our analysis echo some recent findings from a recent World Bank (2018) 
report on structural transformation in Africa. While our analysis focuses on distributional 
changes, the report looks at changes in the labor markets and productivity that might explain 
the low growth-to-poverty elasticity in Africa. The low contribution of employment growth to 
poverty reduction, slow gains in agricultural productivity and a transition outside agriculture 
towards sectors characterized by equally low productivity all contributed to characterize SSA 
growth as little inclusive and consequently less able than other regions in the world in reducing 
poverty.  From a distributional point of view, our paper complements this analysis by showing 
that this missed opportunity also translated into an increasing divide between the bottom 30-40 
percent of the consumption distribution and the rest. 
5 Summary conclusions  
 
Since the end of the 1990s, two leading narratives prevailed when analyzing Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The first, predominant, painted a picture of a continent on track in reducing poverty, 
where middle classes were expanding, and prosperity was reaching large swaths of the 
population (African Development Bank, 2011; The Economist, 2011, 2013; McKinsey, 2012). 
The other narrative acknowledged the relatively robust growth, with a slow reduction in 
poverty, without however conclusive evidence on the mechanisms that hindered growth from 
trickling down. 
This paper, to our knowledge, is the first attempt to provide a comprehensive explanation, 
from a distributive point of view, of this low growth elasticity to poverty that characterized SSA 
in a time when other regions in the world, growing as much as Africa, fared much better in 
terms of poverty reduction. 
To show that important distributional changes took place in SSA and that these played 
against inclusive growth, this paper develops a novel yet simple decomposition based on the 
“relative distribution” method (Handcock and Morris, 1998, 1999). Whereas the standard 
“relative distribution” method enables to summarize multiple features of the welfare 
distribution, our small innovation links these changes to the poverty reduction process 
producing a poverty growth polarization decomposition. 
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In a nutshell, we find that the vast majority of SSA countries we analyze (about 80 
percent) between the late 1990s and early 2010s experienced a very similar distributional 
change of lower polarization—that is the clustering of the poorest 30-40 percent around a local 
mean and an increasing divide between this group and the rest of the distribution. We also 
observe an upgrading in the distribution that is the fattening of the upper tail of the distribution 
(upper polarization), but only in the case of Nigeria this is commensurate to the lower 
polarization. 
This low polarization process has important implications for poverty reduction. The 
proposed decomposition shows that polarization substantially reduces the positive effect of 
growth on poverty reduction: on average without downgrading, poverty could have been 5-6 
percentage points lower in SSA. Standard decompositions of poverty into growth and inequality 
components fail to capture the impact of this distributional change on poverty also because there 
is hardly a common Gini pattern in SSA, whereas we show there is a clear downgrading pattern. 
The potential policy implications are numerous. First, we show that the type of growth 
SSA experienced in the last decade was a sort of double-edged sword. It certainly reduced 
poverty but at the same time it increased the divide between the bottom 40 percent (World Bank, 
2012) and the rest of the population. Therefore, since SSA’s growth is not inclusive per se, 
more efforts should be put to expand the benefits of growth by diversifying economies into 
labor intensive sectors and reducing the divide between advanced and underdeveloped regions 
within each country. Second, it looks like this divide is a slow-motion process that accumulated 
over many years; evidence from Ghana and Nigeria for example (Bertoni et al., 2016; Clementi 
et al., 2017, 2018) indicates that human capital, demography and basic infrastructures are the 
main drivers of the polarization process. Reversing this trend will require time and resources in 
a macroeconomic context that has substantially worsened after 2014; many SSA countries yet 
again experienced sluggish growth, high inflation rates and falling fiscal revenues. 
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